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Timely

Resp was convicted of rape after a jury trial in

: 1 , , . , - ~ ~Mich state court and was sentenced to 20-40 yrs imprisonment,
;~

::;•

?n appeal his c_o nviction was. affirmed unanimously by the

l ~ ~,,..M Mich Ct of Appeals and the Mi.ch Sup Ct.
~.;ft-

J-

~16

.

/

.

{f L

The E.D. Mich

(Freeman) then granted habeas relief holding that the ~

testimony of a witness who was discovered through ~

ments

made by petr to police after insufficient Mira nda warnings
should have been excluded.

CA 6 aff·irmed by order and

the ,State
is seeking a writ.
,__I

-21. Facts

On April 19, 1966 (Mirm:la was 6/13/66) a previously

chaste 43 old woman was found ra~ed, beaten and bound, by
police in her •h~me.

A dog 1 not belonging to the victim1

was in the home when the police arrived and when the
dog was let out by the police it wondered over to a

nearby home.

After questioning some neighbors the

pplice discovered that petr lived in the home where the
dog went.

Petr was then taken down to the station for

-----

At police headquarters, scratches were observed

undershorts.

Prior to interrogating petr, the police

questioning.

on petr•s face and blood was found on his clothes and

,e
.,, ~

advised him that he had a right to remain silent and the
right _to contact a lawyer.

He was ~

- to a court appointed attorney.

7 :::

advised of his right

Petr agreed to talk

1
:::::::::,::1::: :::::::e:::::::::~:.w:::

:n::i:~:•

he refute petr's alibi, he told the police that shortly
after the ' time of the rape petr came to his house.
stated that

Henderson

he asked petr how he got the scratches on

his face and whether it was "a wild one or something."
Petr replied "something like that."

Henderson then asked

who it was and the petr replied "She's a widow woma n who
was in her thirties and lived the next block over."
-Hend ers on testified as to these statements at trial
)
·)

even th9ugh iD ~was stipulated that knowledge of Hend e rson
was obtained solely through petr's state ments to the police.
The petr 's t ria l took pla ce a f ter the Mira nda decision,

-3-

(Miranda applies to .all trials held after the date of the
decision, Johnson v, N.J.,384 U.S. 719) and the trial court
found that eetr's statements to the police were inadmissable
because of inadequate warnings.

~

The state trial ct and

both state appeal courts held, however, that tlenderson'~
testimony was admissible even though it was a "fruit of
the poison9us tree."
Decisions below

After exhausting stat~ remedies, petr

filed this §2254 action in the E.D.Mich and relief was
there granted.

The D.Ct. (opinion p 14 of cert petn)

noted that the s.Ct has held ·the"fruits"of 4th Am violations

·-

(Wong Sun) and 6th Am violations (Wade and Gilbert) inadmissible and in Harrison v.

u.s,,

392 U.S. 219, the Ct

held that testimony of an accused ~ould not be admitted
at a subsequent trial where the testimony at the first
trial was induced by use of accused's confession taken in
violation of the 5th Am.

----- ______________,
reserved the issue sub

Footnote nine of Harrison explicitly

judice~

"We have no occasion in this case to canvass the complex
and varied problems that arise when the trial testimony
of a witness other t~an the accused is challenged as 1 the
evidentary product of the poisened -tree."
On the basis of the above-cited cases, the D.Ct concluded
tha:: Henderson•s testimony was an ina dmissible fruit of
a Miranda violation.

The D.Ct distinguished Harris v.

lis.X..t_, 401 U.S. 222 1 by noting that the ·-Miranda-violative

statements in that case were only held admissible to
impeach on cross-examination and not in the prosecution's
case-in-chief.

Responding to the obviously relevant dissent
j

-

Miranda did not
require the extra increment

deterrent thct: was gained

in that case, the D.Ct repl eds
"Whatever the motivation of a government agent in failing x1
to warn a defendant, the government should not be allowed
to benefit from the violation of defendant's rights."
The Ct also found it irrelevant that petr•s statements
were exculpatory rather than inculpatory and that the

I tes~ mony at

~

~

issue was given by a t~ird person rather

than defendant himself. (citing Wade and Gilbert which

---------------

.
involved 3rd party
identification evidence).

Finally,

-------

the D.Ct found that the error was not harmless.

'------------c--:----=--------------

In a

short opinion CA 6 affirmed the D.Ct. noting "we are
in full agreement with the opiniori of the D.Ct."
3.

Contentions

Petr relies primarily on two CADC

decisions written or joined by then Judge Burger that
held the exclusionary rule inapplicable to this situation.
Smith v. U.S. 324 F.2d 879 (1963)r ~ n v. U.S. 375 F.2d
310 (1967)~
-:::__

Noting that the Ct itself has viewed this

issue as unresolved (fn 9 in Harrison, supra) and that
"a vicious rapist"will be set free if the CA is allowed to
stand, petr argues that the Ct should grant cert.

Petr

also argues that the mere failure of the police to advise
petr of his right to a court appointed lawyer did not
render these exculpatory statements involuntary and to
the extent Miranda mandates that result, Miranda is wrong.
In a one page response 1 resp arg~es that "a ruling by
this Ct on the issue raised by petr would not be dispositve
of this case" because several other contentions were raised

-5·p

below by resp that were not passed on by the D.Ct. [I fail
to see the relevance of this].

Resp also notes that

a recent Mich Ct, of App opinion, People v. Robinson,210NW2d 372,
was denied review by the Mich Sup Ct and that there the
law of Mich. was made to conform to nhe decision of

CA 6 in this case.

Finally, resp mentions that CA 6 was

correct.

4.

Discussion

The facts leave resp in a rather

unsympathetic posture and assuming the Ct is not inclined

--

to extend Miranda, CA 6 will have to be corrected.

The

Ct has never decided that witnes·ses discovered through
Miranda-violative interrogation cannot testify and as
noted, _the question was left unresolved in Harrison.
If the Ct does wish to reverse CA 6 .i t _would not -be
necessa ry to make serious inroads on Miranda inasmuch
as a)this was the testimony of a 3rd party, not the def
that was excluded: b) the wanings were almost perfect
and it is difficult to call these statments "involuntary";
and c) the' statements were exculpatory.
There is a response
11/12/73
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MICHIGAN

Motion~ of Resp for
Appointment of Counsel
and to permit ennet M.
Mogill to argue .E.!E_ hac vice

Vo

TUCKER
The Court granted cert to CA 6 in this case on December 3 to
c.o hsider the admissibility of third party testimony dis covered as a result
of an improper Miranda interrogation.

The Court also granted resp 1 s

motion to proceed IFP.
Through counsel, resp requests that Kenneth M. Mogill of Detroit

-

be appointed to represent him before this Court.

Mr. Mogill was admitted

to practice before the Michigan SC in November, 1971.

His practice is

- ..

~ ·'

...
- 2 -

devoted almost exclusively to criminal trial and appellate law.

I

H e has

tried numerous capital cases, argued before the Mich. CA and ha s
written numerous briefs in the Mich. SC.

Counsel has also taught classes

in criminal law at the University of Michigan, Wayne State University,
Eastern Michigan University a.rid at two bar sponsored seminars.
Mr. Mogill has represented resp as appointed counsel below,
prepared the Brief in Opposition to the cert petition and the brie f of resp
on the merits.

He is the only attorney completely familiar with the record

in this case.
Counsel states that in view of the substantial amount of time he
has expended preparing the briefs in this case, he is willing to proceed
as resp' s attorney at his own expense if the Motion for Appointment is
denied.
Resp also moves that Mr. Mogill be permitted to argue £_!£ hac vice.
Ginty
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The issue in this case is whether the exclusionary
rule should have been applied to exclude the testimony of a
witness when that witness was discovered through a Mirandaviolative interrogation of the defendant himself.

The crucial

twist to the case is added by the fact that the interrogation
occurred prior to Miranda and was proper when conducted, but
since the trial occurred after Miranda, under Johnson v. New
Jersey, 384 U.S. 719 (1966) Miranda was applied.
In view of the fact that ( 1) the interrogation occurred
prior to Miranda, (2) the violation was a technical one only
(he was not told of his right to appointed counsel), and (3) it is
unquestioned but that resp's statements were voluntarily given,

'--=--------_:.----------=--=--

it would seem that reversal is strongly mandated.

Nonetheless,

I am firmly of the view that the rationale of Miranda is valid and
important, and have endeavored both for that reason and because
of the principle of stare decisis to find a method of reversing
the case which will avoid doing unnecessary damage to
Miranda.

As I will argue, there is, rather, no reason to

apply the Miranda - exclusionary rule to this case.

After

explaining my proposed disposition of the case, I will elaborate

-

four other possible bases upon which to reverse the case.

2

Basically, Miranda dictates the exclusion of evidence
obtained in violation thereof for three possible reasons:
( 1) statements or confessions obtained in violation thereof
are thought to have a high potential for unreliability in view
of the subtle and at times not so subtle coercive pressures which
t'.,

may be brought to bear by the polic~ on one who is detained
or in custody.

(2)

the rule is seen as a means of deterring

the police from engaging in blatantly improper conduct in
obtaining such statements, and (3) the more general notion
that a person should not be convicted on the basis of improper
government conduct.
Applying the final and most general rationale first,
it seems clear that the conviction here was not in fact
obtained by the use of improper police techniques in any
way.

The police behavior here was not only in compliance with

the then-existing law when the interrogation itself was conducted,
but in view of the warnings given.,was probably exemplary.
Accordingly, the integrity of the process is really not involved
in this case in view of the pre-Miranda interrogation.
Applying the first principle, it seems there is little
risk of unreliability with respect to these statements.

-

This

is so because (1) it seems that on the facts of this case the
exculpatory statement given by resp himself was clearly
voluntarily given, and much more importantly, (2) the evidence the

3

court sought to exclude was not the "coerced" statements of the
defendant but rather the voluntary testimony at trial of a

-

third per son.

Whenever one is dealing with the "fruits " of the

defendant's statements, rather than the statements themselves,
the fear of unreliability is effectively nullified, though other
concerns, as discussed below, do persist.

It is the fear of

unreliability which to my mind is the most vital underlying

--

rationale for Miranda and the one which I would most strongly
fight to see preserved.

The absence of that concern here

relieves me of the most substantial concerns I would have about
reversing the case.
The most-often repeated rationale for the Miranda
exclusionary rule, though to my mind not the most important,
is the need to deter improper police conduct by excluding
evidence obtained thereby.

Hand in hand with the notion of

deterrence, however, goes also the recognition that if the
police were free to use involuntary statements as leads in
proceeding against criminal defendants, the Fifth Amendment
itself would be substantially eroded.
States, 406 U.S. 441 (1972).

See Kastigar v. United

In this case, however, the

statements were made prior to Miranda and the defect in the

-

warnings were clearly technical at best.

No deterrent

-

4

purpose whatsoever is thus served by excluding statements and
their fruits elicited prior to Miranda obtained by police conduct
which was proper at the time.

Thus, the third rationale also

seems inapplicable here.
Accordingly, I would argue that this case is distinguishable
from Miranda and should be reversed by holding that the
exclusionary rule does not apply to the fruits of a pre-Miranda
statement where the statement was its~lf admissable when
taken.

The only remaining hurdle to such a disposition is the

decision of the Court in Johnson v. New Jersey, supra, which

•

held that Miranda applies to all trials held after that decision •
Johnson appears to have been a compromise between total
retrospectivity (Gideon) and total prospectivity, (Linkletter).
The obvious reason for not making the decision totally prospective
was the desire to avoid any further use of such potentially
unreliable confessions in subsequent trials, while the reasons
for not giving it full retrospective application appear to have
been the fear of unmanageability arising from the large
number of convictions which would be overturned and the
absence of any deterrent effect to be gained.

In this case, it

would seem that Johnson can be distinguished and not followed

-

---

precisely because this case is itself distinguishable from Miranda
and therefore doesn't fall under the Johnson rule 1 and more
directly, because there is no fear of unreliability here such as

-

5

to invoke the retroactive application of the Miranda rule to
statements taken prior to Miranda.
Thus, the case is distinguishable from Miranda and
Johnson in that it is the fruits and not the actual statements
themselves which are involved, meaning no reliability problems
exist and no deterrent purpose would be served since the statements were taken prior to Miranda in any case.

Once again,

"holding would be simply that the exclusionary rule does not
apply to the fruits of a statement taken prior to Miranda ,which
was proper and admis sable when taken.

•

0~

possible dispositions of the case include the following:

(1) the most simplistic approach would be simply to overrule
Miranda outright and return to the pre-Miranda voluntariness
standard.

As noted, this seems both undesirable, in that it

would increase the likelihood that a person might be convicted on
the basis of his own unreliable confession or statement, and
unnecessary in view of the possibility of distinguishing Miranda
and Johnson.

Moreover, in Harrison v. U.S., 392 U.S. 219

( 1968), the Court explicitly noted that it had not decided this
issue in Miranda.

In holding that the testimony of an accused

could not be admitted at a subsequent trial where the testimony

-

of the first trial was induced by the use of a Miranda-violative

)

-

6

confession, the Court noted:
we have no occasion in this case to canvass
the complex and varied problems that arise
when th e trial testimony of a witne ~
er
th~
d is challenged as ~ e -=::::::::;evidentiary product of the poisonous tree. 1

It seems to me the Court cannot on these facts attempt to decide
how these iss~es would be re _s olved i_f the statements were postMiranda, or if the statements rather than the fruits were

,

involved, or if improper police misconduct were involved.

That

is simply not this case, and hence Miranda cannot be directly
·reached here.

•

(2)

The Court could adopt the recommendation of the

Calif AG and hold that Miranda issues are not reviewable on
state habeas.

There is some support for such a position in your

concurrence in Bustamante, although that dealt only with Fourth
Amendment claims.

I think it unwise to follow this course both

•

because I believe it to be wrong as a matter of law, and because
in any case, it would be inappropriate to do so where the issue
was neither briefed or decided in this or the lower courts.
(3)

The Court could 7 as petr strongly urges, overrule

•

Johnson v. New Jersey and hold that Miranda applies only to
confessions taken after the decision, not simply to trials there-

-

after.

While Johnson was 5-4, it seems unwise to toy with a

decision on retractivity when alternatives are available.

-

7

(4)

Finally, there is a possible disposition with two

alternatives itself. The first would be simply to follow the
approach of the Chief Justice in his two CA DC opinions,
Smith v. U.S., 324 F. 2d 879 (1963) and Brown v. U.S., 375
F. 2d 310 (1967), and to hold that the exclusionary rule does
not apply to testimonial fruits as opposed to 1;_h y sical evidence.
Aside from the obscurity of the logic of this distinction to me,
it seems to ignore whatever deterrent value the exclusionary

rule has, though this is of course a substantial question in and of

•

I

itself.

Moreover, this distinction was explicitly rejected by

Justice Brennan for the Court in W o ng Sun, 371 U . S. at 484-6 •
A broader variation of this argument, which comes
substantially closer to the position I have argued, is suggested
in a late amicus submission by the SG in which he argues Miranda
applies only to the actual confessions and statements and not their
derivative use, or the
or otherwise.

11

fruits 1 1 they produce, be they testimonial

As I have ar gued, I would not attempt to decide

whether Miranda applies but rely on the fact that these statements
w ere e licited prior to Miranda.

To adopt the SG' s position would

mean that even the fruits of gross police misconduc t could be
introduced and would cast in doubt both Wong Sun and Kastigar as

-

well.

-

8

Accordingly, I would recommend reversing the case
on the ground that the exclusionary rule does not apply to the
fruits of a statement elicited prior to the decision in Miranda
which was proper when taken.

3/19/74
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Dear Chief:
As a result of further consideration of the above
case, I am now inclined not to go as far as I indicated at
Conference in terms of the basis of a Court decision at
this time.

I will still vote to reverse. This result could
be reached, I think, on the ground advanced by Potter,
namely, that there was no violation of the Miranda rule,
because it had not then been enunciated by this Court.
Thus, there was no police misconduct and hence no question
of detering improper police conduct. Or putting it
differently, there was simply no violation by the police
of Miranda or any other law.
The testimony therefore
was admissible.
If we were to decide the case on this narrow
ground, it would be unnecessarft to address the much broader
question of the use of "fruits' derived from an interrogation
which violated the Miranda per se rule.
Sincerely,

The Chief Justice
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yculated:

State of Michigan,
d
On Wnt of Cert10ran to the Umte
P et 1·t·10ner,
States Court of Appeals for the
v.
Sixth Circuit.
Thomas W. Tucker.

et- 2..-

[May - , 1974]
MH. JUSTICE REHNQUIST delivered the opinion of the
Court.
This case presents the question whether the testimony
of a witness in respondent's state court trial for rape must
be excluded simply because police had learned the identity
of the witness by questioning respondent at a time when
he was in custody as a suspect, but had not been advised
that counsel would be appointed for him if he was indigent. The questioning took place before this Court's
decision in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), but
respondent's trial, at which he was convicted, took place
afterwards. Under the holding of Johnson v. New Jersey,
384 U. S. 719 ( 1966) , therefore, the principles of Miranda
are applicable to this case. The United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Michigan reviewed
petitioner 's claim on a petition for habeas corpus and held
that the testimony must be excluded. 1 The Court of
Appeals affirmed.2

I
On the morning of April 19, 1966, a 43-year-old woman
in Pontiac, Michigan, was found in her home by a friend
1

352 F. Supp. 266 (1972),
H80 F. 2d 927 (1973).

~
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and coworker, Luther White, in serious condition. At
the time she was found the woman was tied, gagged, and
partially disrobed. and had been both raped and severely
beaten. She was unable to tell White anything about.
her assault at that time and still remains unable to
recollect what happened.
While White was attempting to get medical help for
the victim and to call for the police, he observed a dog
inside the house. This apparently attracted White's at•
tention for he knew that the woman did not own a dog
herself. Later, when talking with police officers, White
observed the dog a second time, and police followed the
dog to respondent's house. Neighbors further connected
the dog with respondent.
The police then arrested respondent and brought him
to the police station for questioning. Prior to the actual
interrogation the police asked respondent whether he
knew for what crime he had been arrested. whether he
wanted an attorney, and whether he understood his
constitutional rights. 3 Respondent replied that he did
understand the crime for which he was arrested, that he
did not want an attorney, and that he understood his
rights. 4 The police further advised him that an y state~
ments he might make could be used against him at a
later date in court." The police, however. did not advise
respondent that he would be furnished counsel free of
charge if he could not pay for such services himself.
The police then questioned respondent about his activ~
ities on the night of the rape and assault. Respondent
replied that during the general time period at issue he had
first been with one Robert Hendersou and then later at
home, alone, asleep. The police sought to confirm thi~
3

Transcript of Prehminar;v Hearing, lJ , 9!:l,

Ibid.
" Ibid , p 99- 100.
4
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'

t!fory by contacting Henderson. but Henderson's story
served to discredit rather than to bolster respondent's
account. Henderson acknowledged that respondent had
been with him on the night of the crime but said that he
had left at a relatively early time. Furthermore, Hen"
derson told police that he saw respondent the following
day and asked him at that time about scratches on his
face-"asked him if he got hold of a wild one or some•
thing.""
Respondent answered, "[S] omething like
that." 7 Then, Henderson said, he asked respondent
"[W]ho it was, '' 8 and respondent said: "[8]ome woman
lived the next block over,"" adding "She is a widow
woman" or words to that effect. tn
These events all occurred prior to the date on which
this Court handed <lown its decision i11 Miranda v. Ari"
zona, 384 U.S. 473, but respondent's trial occurred afterwards. Prior to trial respondent;s appornted counsel
made a motion to exclude Henderson 's expected testimony
because respondent had revealed HP11derson 's identity
without having received full Miranda warnings. Although respondent's own statements takeu during interrogation were excluded. the trial judge denied the motioll to
exclude Henderson 's testimony. Henderson therdore
testified at trial, and respondent was convicted of rape
and sentenced to :20 to 40 years· i111prisurnnent. His
conviction was affirrned by both the Y!iclugan Court of
Appeals 11 and by the Michigan Supreme Court. 12
Respondent then sought habeas corpus relief in federal
9-istrict court. That court, noting that respondent had
6

Tran:,cript of Trial, p. 223,

• Ibid
s ibid .. p 224.
~

flnd.
ibid

'JO

11

l9 Mich. App. :320, 17:2 N. W. 2d i l:2 (l!:Jti!:l).

n 385 l\lich. 5H4, 189 N'. W. 2d WO (1971).

l
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not received the full Miranda warnings and that the
police had stipulated Henderson's identity was learned
only through respondent's answers, "reluctantly" concluded that Henderson's testimony could not be admitted.13 Application of such an exclusionary rule was
necessary, the court reasoned, to protect respondent's
Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination. The
court therefore granted respondent's petition for a writ
of habeas corpus unless petitioner retried respondent
within 90 days. The Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit affirmed. We granted certiorari, U. S. ·- ,
and now reverse.

II
Although respondent's sole complamt is that the police
failed to advise him That he would be given free counsel
if unable to afford counsel himself. he did not, and does
not now, base his arguments for reli~f on a right to coumel
under the Si"xt1i and Fourteenth Am;1dments. Nor was
the right to counsel, as such. considered to be persuasive
by either federal court below. We do not have a situation such as that presented in Escobedo v. Illinois , 378
U. S. 478 ( 1964) , where the policemen interrogating th e
suspect had refused his repeated requests to see his lawyer
who was then present at the police station . As we have
noted previously , Escobedo is not to be broadly extended
beyond the facts of that particular case. See Johnson v.
New Jersey, 384 P. S. 719 , 733-7;34 (1966); Kirby v.
Illinois, 406 U. S. 682, 689 (1972); Frazier v. Cupp, 394
U. S. 731 , 739 (1969). This case also falls outside the
rationale of Wade v. United States, 388 U. S. 218, 224
(1967). where the Court held that counsel was needed at
a post-mdictment lineup in order to protect "the right
to a fair trial at which the ,Yitnesses against l the defendant] might be meaningfully cross-exarnwed." Hender~
13

852 F, Supp., at 2(18,

;.f
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Bon was fully available for searching cross-exami1l'ation
at respondent's trial.
rd A
I-~
Respondent's argument, and the opinions of the District 7/o 1-- aM. ~ ·
Court and Court of Appeals, instead rely upon the Fifth <f1!/C1t.~
Amendment right against self-incrimination and the safe- /rOM-J M..
guards designed in Miranda to secure that right. In brief, ~
the position urged upon this Court is that proper regard , for the privilege against self-incrimination requires, with
limited exceptions not applicable here, that all evidence
derived solely from statements made without full Miranda
warnings be excluded at a subsequent criminal trial. For
purposes of analysis in this case we believe that the
question thus presented is best examined in two separate
parts. We will therefore first consider whether the police
c~mduct complained of di~ectlyin_fringecf""up~ respond~
enys rig!it against self:incrimination or whether it iustea<l
violated only the prophylactic rules developed to protect
that right. We will then consider whether the evidence
derived from this interrogation must be excluded.

~ ~
J~d ~ .

III
The history of the Fifth Amendment right against self~
incrimination, and the evils against which it was directed ,
have received considerable attention iu the opinions of
this Court. See, e. g. Kastigar v. United States, 406 P . S.
441 (1972); Miranda Y. Arizona, supra; Murphy v.
Waterfront Commission, 378 U.S. 52 (1964); Ullmann v.
United States, 350 U.S. 422, 426 (1956); Counselman v.
Hitchcock, 142 U. S. 547 (1892) . At this point in our
history virtually every schoolboy is familiar with the
concept, if not the language, of the provision that reads ;
''No person ... shall be compelled in any criminal case
to be a witness against himself . • .'' This Court's decisions have referred to the right as "the mainstay of our
adversary sy§tem of criminal justice," Johnson v. Xew
Jersey, supra, at_ 729, and as" 'one of the great landmark~

73-482-0PINIO:N'
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in man's struggle to make himself civilized. '" Ullmann,
supra, at 426. It is not surprising that the constitution
of virtually every State has a comparable provision.
VIII Wigmore, Evidence (McNaughton rev. 1961 ),
§ 2252.
The importance of a right does not, by itself, determine
its scope, and therefore we must continue to hark back
to the historical origins of the privilege, particularly the
evils at which it was to strike. The privilege against
compulsory self-incrimination was developed by painful
opposition to a course of ecclesiastical inquisitions and
Star Chamber proceedings occurri11g several centuries ago,
See Levy, Origins of the Fifth Amendment; Morgan , The
Privilege Against Self-Incrirninatioll . 34 Minn . L. Rev_ 1
(1949); Wigmore. Evidence (McKaughton rev. H/61 )
§ 2250. Certainly anyone who reads accounts of those
investigations, which placed a premium on compelling
subjects of the investigation to admit guilt from their
own lips. cannot help but be sensitive to the framers'
desire to protect citizens against such compulsion. As
this Court has noted. the privilege against self-incrimination "was- aimed at a ... far-reaching evil-a recurrence
of the Inquisitio11 and the Star Chamber, even if not in
their stark brutality." Ullmam1, supra, at 428.
Where there has been genuine compulsion of testimony.
the right has been given broad scope. Although the
constitutional language in which the privilege is cast
might be construed to apply only to situations in which
the prosecution seeks to call a defendant to testify against
himself at his criminal trial. its application has 11ot been
so limited. The right has been held applicable to proceedings before a grand jury, Counselman \ Hitchcock,
142 U. S. 547 (1892) , to civil proceedings, McCarthy v.
Arndstein, 266 U. S. 34 (1924), to congressional investi~
gations. Watkins v. United States, 354 P . S. 178 (1957) 1

JJB.Ol~I:~

uJ~.

73-482-0PIN!0N
MICHIGAN v. TUCKER

1

to juvenile proceedings, In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967) ,
and to other statutory inquiries. Malloy v. Hogan , 378
U. S. 1 (1964). · The privilege has also been applied
against the States by virtue of the Fourteenth Amendment. Malloy, supra.
The natural concern which underlies many of these
decisions is that an inability to protect the right at
one stage of a proceeding may make its invocation useless
at a later stage. For example, the right of a defendant
not to testify against himself at his own trial might be
practically nullified if the prosecution could previously
have required him to give evidence against himself before a grand jury. Testimony obtained in civil suits. or
before administrative or legislative committees. could also
prove so incriminating that a person giving such testimony might readily be convicted on the basis of those
disclosures in a subsequent criminal proceeding. 11
In more recent years this concern-that compelled dis~
closures might be used against a person at a later criminal
trial-has been extended to cases involving police interrogation. Before Miranda the principal issue in these cases
was not whether a defendant had waived his privilege
against self-incrimination but simply whether his statement was "voluntary.'' In state cases the Court applied
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,
examining the circumstances of interrogation to determine
whether the processes \Vere so unfair or unreasonable as
to render a subsequent confession involuntary. See, e. g.,
Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U. S. 278 (1936); Chambers v.
Florida, 309 U.S. 227 (1940); White v. Texas, 310 U.S.
530 (1940); Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U. S. 560 (1958 );
14 The Court has also held that comme11t on a defendant\, :;ilence
or refusal to take the witness stand may be an impem1issible penalty
on exercise of the privilege. See Griffin v f'a!iforn ia, 380 U S. 6W
(1965),
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Haynes v. Washington, 373 U. S. 503 (1963). See also
Wigmore, Evidence, § 815 et seq. Where the State's
actions offended the standards of fundamental fairness
under the Due Process Clause, the State was then deprived of the right to use the resulting confessions in
court.
Although federal cases concerning voluntary confessions
often contained references to the privilege against selfincrimination,"' references which were strongly criticized
by some commentators, see VIII Wigrnore, Evidence
(McNaughton rev. 1961), § 2266, 11; it was not until this
1 5 For example in Bram. v. United States , 168 l'. S. 532, 542
(1897), the Court stated:
"In criminal tnals. in the courts of the l 1111t•d States, wherever a
4uestion arises whether a C'onfession 18 mcompet ent becam,e 11ot
voluntary, the is:,me is controlled by t.liat ponion of the Fifth
Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, commanding
that no person 'shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness agajnst him,;elf.'"
As noted in the text the privilege against self-incrimination was not
held applicable against the States until Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U. S. 1

(1964) .
W1gmorc states his objection in the following term,,:
"Today in the United States confession~. and probably even lesi:iel'
.,;elf-incriminating admissions, are f'Xcluded de~pit e their trustworthiness if coerced. The policies leading to this n•ceut extension of
the confession rule are quite :;imilar to those underlying the privilege
against self-incrimination. It is thus not :inrprising that the privi•
lege, with its unclear boundaries and apparently unending capacity
for transmogrification and assimilation, is now sometimes invoked
to effect. exclusion even though the disclosure was not compelled
from a person under legal compulsion. Distortion of the privilege
to cover such situations is not neces,;ary. If trustworthy confessions are to be excluded because coerced, it should be done frankly
as an exception to the principle of § 2183 su.pra tlwt tlw illegality of
source of evidence is immaterfr1I. It 8hould be donf, as it usually i::, ,
on the ground that the combinat10n of coercion tmd u::;P of the evi1.dence in the particular case violates thr relPvant con~titutional due
proce&'-' <'lause." (Citations omitted.)
16
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·court's decision in Miranda that the privilege against
~ self-incrimination was seen as the principal protection
a person facing police interrogation. This privilege
had been maae applicable to the 'States in Malloy " ·
Hogan, 378 U. S. 1 ( 1964), a,nd was thought to offer
a more comprehensive and less subjective protection than
the doctrine of previous cases. In Miranda the Court
examined the facts of four separate cases and stated:
"In these cases, we might not find the de/ fendants'
statements to have been involuntary in traditional
terms. Our concern for adequate safeguards to pro"'
tect precious Fifth Amendment rights is. of course
not lessened in the slightest
To be sure, the
records do not evince overt physical coercio11 or
patent psychological ploys. The fact remai11s that
in none of these cases did the officers undertake to
afford appropriate safeguards at the outset of th
interrogation to insure that the statements were truly
the product of free choice." 384 U. S .. at 457.

·f;

Thus the Court in .lvliranda, for tlw first tilne. expressly
declared that the Self-Incrimination Clau~e was applicable to state interrogatio11s_,r_t a police stat10n, and th_at
a defendant's statements nught be t>xcluded at tnal
despite their voluntary rharaet<'1 u11d('r t.raditional
principles.
To supplement this new doctriue, and to help police
officers conduct interrogations without facing a continued
risk that valuable evidence would be lost, the Court in
J11iranda established a set of s Jecific )rotective uidelines, now commonly nown as the Af irrznda rules. The
Cour ec are t at
e prosecutiou may not use statements, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, stemming
from custodial interrogation of the defendant unless it
demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards effective
!iO secure the privilege against self-incrimination.'' 384

.c_

(

~

~
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U. S., at 444. A series of recommended "procedural safe~
guards" then followed. The Court in particular stated :
"Prior to any questioning, the person must be
warned that he has a right to remain silent, that
any statement he does make may be used as evidence
against him, and that he has a right to the presence
of an attorney, either retained or appointed ." 384
U. S., at 444.
The Court said that the defendant, of course, could
waive these rights, but that any waiver must have been
made "voluntarily. knowingly and intelligently." 384
U. S., at 444.
The Court recognized that t ~ procedural safeguimls
w~re not themselves rights protected by the ConstitutiQ!l
but were instead measures to insure that the right
against self-uicriii1ination was protectea." As tne Court
remarked:
"[W]e cannot say that the Constitution necessarily
requires adherence to any particular solution for the
inherent compulsions of tlw interrogation process as
it is presently conducted .'' 384 F . S .. at 467.
The suggested safeguards were not iutended to "create a
constitutional straight jacket,., 384 U . S. , at 467, but
rather to provide practical reinforcement for the right
against self-incrimination.
A comparison of the facts in this case ,dth the historical circumstances underlying the privilege against
compulsory self-incrimination strongly indicates that the
police conduct here did not deprive respondent of his
privilege against self-incrimination as such, but rather
failed to make available to him the full measure of pro(:edural .-•~afeguards associated with tha,t right since
Miranda. Certainly no one could contend that the interrogation faced by respondent bore any resembl1:1,nce to

,J

I

qt/~~
.-w.&.

ew. :t._L-

~J

911~~ ~

~ ~ ~
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1le

~

the historical practices at which the right against self~
incrimination was aimed. The District Court in this
(.,.·
case noted that the police had "warned [respondent]
that he had the right to remain silent," 352 F. Supp.,
at 267, and the record in this case clearly shows that
respondent was informed that any evidence taken could
be used against him, 1' The record is also clear that
respondent was asked whether he wanted an attorney
and that he replied that he did not. 18 Thus, his state•
rnents could hardly be termed involuntary as that term
has been defined in the decisions of this Court. Addi~
tionally, there were no legal sanctions. such as the threat
of contempt, which could have been applied to respondent had he chosen to remain silent. He was simply not
exposed to "the cruel trilemma of self-accusation. perjury, /7 JI
I J, ·
or contempt.'' Murphy v. Waterfr011t Commission, 378
'-/1..u, 14 ~ - - - ]
U.S. 52, 55 (1964) .
'--f1A.A'-- ""-' /tJ,tJn§'
Our determination that the mterrogatiou in this case
~
iiwolved no compulsion sufficient to breach the right
;,.;..;..i.,t,..;.._ _..
against self.incrimination does not mean there was not
a disregard, albeit an inadvertent disregard, of the procedural rules established in Miranda. The question for
decision is how sweeping the judicially imposed consequences of this disregard shall be. Thii,, Court said in
J.11iranda that statements takeu in violation of the
Miranda principles must not be used to prove th e prosecution's case at trial. That requirement was fully
complied with by the state court here : respondent's
statements, claiming that he was with Henderson and
then asleep during the time period of the crime were not
admitted against him at trial. This Court has also said,
in Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963), that
the "fruits'' of police conduct which actually infringed
l

uD/1

r.

µjp/

?

~- ~
~ w ~-r
~

·

<YJ1 •

17
18

See n 5, supra,
See nn. 3 and 4, supm.

~

.
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a defendant's Fourth Amendment rights must be sup-pressed.10 But we have already concluded that the
police conduct at issue here did not abridge respondent's constitutional privilege against compulsory selfincrimination, but departed only from the prophylactic
standards laid down by this Court in Miranda to safeguard that privilege. Thus, in deciding whether Henderson's testimony must be excluded, there is no controlling precedent of this Court to guide us. We must
therefore examine the matter as a question of principle,

IV

~ {).
~

.
".'

t-J.. ~

~
l..n4

~

~~,_.

v.,..,,J.._, ,._,

Just as the law does no.t require that a defendant £fl.
I 1
receive a perfect trial, only a fair one. it cannot realistit J ~ «rif/ « ~ hC..
1
cally require that policeinen investigating serious crimes ti....
~ ~
make no errors whatsoever. The pressures of law
· ()
·
enforcement and the vagaries of human nature would
make such an expectation unrealistic. Before we
penalize police error, therefore, we must consider whether
the sanction serves a valid and useful purpose.
We have recently said, in a search and seizure coutext,
that the exclusionary rule's "prime purpose is to deter
future unlawful police conduct and thereby to effectuate
the guarantee of the :F ourth Amendment against unreasonable searches and seizures.'' United States v.
Calandra, slip op., p. 9. We then continued:
"'The rule is calculated to prevent. not to repair.
Its purpose is to deter-to compel respect for the
constitutional guaranty in the only effective available way-by removing the incentive to disregard

1l_

19
In Wong Sun the police discm·ered evidence through statements made by the accused after he had been placed under arrest.
This Court, finding that the arrn~t had occurred without probable
cause, held that the derivative evidence contd not he introduceq
against the accused at trial. For the rea::;on~ stated in the text we
do not believe that Wong Sun controls the case before us,
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1t.' Elkins v. United States, 364 U. S. 206, 217
(1960."

20

United States v; Calandra, slip op., p. 9.

In a proper case this rationale would seem applicable
to the Fifth Amendment context as well.
_ /)
The deterrent purpose of the exclusionary rule neces.: ~ 40 ~
sarily assumes that the police have engaged in willful,
~ ✓
~ •
14
or at the very least, 11eglige~1t conduct whic~ has deprive_d ~ . 4 ~
a,
the defendant of some nght. ~y refusmg to admit
~ '-"'evidence _gai~e~ as a result ?f sue~ cond_uct,_ the courts ~~
hope to mstil m those particular rnvestigatmg officers; ~ ~.t.-z-., ~
bl' in their future counterparts. a greater degree of care 61/4.... h ~
towards the right of an accused. Where the official
~~
action was pursued in complete good faith, however, the ·
~
deterrence rationale loses much of its force.
~~
We consider it significant to our decision in this case
~
,4 ·
·that the officers' failure to advise. respondent of his right
7
to appointed counsel occurred prior to the decision in
p , ·, /
J 1
Miranda!' At the ti111e respondent was questioned thesij ~ I'(...
~
police officers were guided, quite rightly, by the principles
•.k-,. J,,~.
established in Escobedo, supra, particularly focusing on
the subject's opportunity to have retained counsel with
him during the interrogation if he chose to do so. 22

1

"1

~ J

34', '

o/:

J-

~rl

P

'V

20 The opinion also relied upon Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U. S. 643 , 656
(1961); Tehan v. United States, ex rel. Shot, 382 F . S. 406, 416
(1966); a.nd Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1, 29 (1968) . See slip op.,
p. 9.
21
Both respondent and the United States, as amicus curiae, urge
us to decide the broad proposition of whether evidence (''fruits") ,
other than statements of the defendant . obtnined after noncompliance
with the Miranda rules, must be excluded, regardle:,;s of when the
interrogation took place. Because this ca::;e allows decision on a
narrower ground, we leave the bronder question for another day.
22
As previously noted, the defendant in Escobedo had repe-dtedly
asked to see his lawyer who was available at the poli ce ::,tation .
T_h ose requests were denied, and the defrndaut ultimate!~· confessed.
Thus, in direct contra::it to the situation here, t he defendant Ill

~~ i~
~;;"' ~ L
~~~
~-
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Thus, the police asked respondent if he wanted counsel,
and he answered that he did not. The statements actually made by the respondent to the police, as we have observed, were in fact excluded at trial. Whatever deterrent effect on future police conduct the exclusion of those
statements may have had, we do not believe it would be
significantly augmented by excluding the testimony of
the witness Henderson as -well.
When involuntary statements or the right to self- 1•
incrimination are involved, a second justification for the
exclusionary rule also has been asserted: protection of
the courts from reliance on untrustworthy evidence. ,a
Cases which involve the Self-lncriminatio11 Clause must,
by definition, involve au element of coercion, since the
clause provides only that -a person shall not be compelled
to give evidence against himself. Aud cases involving involuntary statements often depict severe pressures which
may override a particular suspect's insistence on innocence. Fact situations ranging from classical third-degree
torture, Brown v. Mississippi, to prolonged isolation from
Escobedo was told he did not have a right to see his lawyer, although
he had expressly stated his desire to do :<o .
23
The Court has made clear that the truth or falsity of a statement i,, not the determining factor m the decision whether or not
to exclude if Jackson v. Denno , 3i8 U. S. 368 (1964) . Thus a
State which has obtained a coerced or involuntary sta tement cannot
argue for its admissibility on the ground tlu~t other evidence demon..strates its truthfufoess. Ibid. But it also seems clear that coerced
statements have been regarded with some mistrust. The Court in
Escobedo, for example, stated that "a system of criminal law enforcement which comes to depend on the 'confession' will , in the long run,
be less reliable and more subject to abuse" than a system relying
on independent investigation, 378 U. S., at 489. The Court then
cited to several authorities concerned with false confessions. 3i8
U S., at 489, n. 11. Although .completely voluntary confessions
may, in many cases, advance the carnse of justice and rehabilitation,
,coerced confessions, by their nature, cannot serve the same ends.
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family or friends in a hostile setting, Gallegos v. Colorado;
370 U. S. 49 ( 1962), or to a simple desire on the part of a
physically or mentally exhausted suspect to have a seemingly endless interrogation e11d , Watts v. Indiana, 338
U, S. 49 ( 1949) , all might be sufficient to cause a defendant to accuse himself falsely,
But those situations are a far cry from that presented
here. The pressures on respondent to accuse himself
were hardly comparable even with the least prejudicial
of those pressures which have been dealt with in out'
cases. More important. the respondent did n9t accuse
himself. The evidence which the prosecution successfully
sought to introduce was not a confession of guilt by
l'espondent, or indeed even an exculpatory statement by
respondent, but rather the testimony of a third party
who was subjected to no custodial pressures. There is
plainly no reason to believe that Henderson's testimony
is untrustworthy simply because respondent was not adv· d of his right to appointed counsel. Henderson was
otn ava1 a e at trial and subject to cross-examination
y responden
counsel, and counsel fully used this op~
portunity, suggesting in the course of his crossexamination that Henderson ·s character was less than
exemplary and that he had been offered illcentives by the
police to testify against respondent. 24 Thus the reliability of his testimony was subject to the normal testing
process of an adversary trial.
Respondent contends that an additional reason for excluding Henderson's testimony is the notion that the
adversarial system requires "the government in its contest
with the individual to shoulder the entire load. " VIII
"\Vigmore, Evidence (McNaughton rev. 1961), ~ 2251;
Murphy v. Waterfront Commission , 378 U. S. 52, 55
(1964); Miranda v. Arizona, s·upra, at 460.
rro
~

Transcript of Trial, p. 226-234.
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the extent that this suggested basis for the exclusionary rule in Fifth Amendment cases may exist
independently of the deterrence and trustworthiness rationales, we think it of no avail to petitioner here. Subject to applicable constitutional limitations, the Government is not forbidden all resort to the defendant to make
out its case. It may require the defendant to give physical evidence against. himself, see Schmerber v. Californw,
384 U. S. 757 (1966) ;' United States v. Dionisio, 410
1!. S. 1 (1973). and it may use statements which are
voluntarily given by the defendant after he recives full
disclosure of the rights offered by 11Iira11da. Here we
deal not with the offer of defendant's own statements in
evidence, but only with the testimony of a witness whom
the police discovered as a result of defendant's statements. This recourse to respondent's voluntary statements does no violence to such elements of the adversarial system as may be embodied in the Fifth, Sixth,
and Fourteenth Amendments.
In summary. we do not think that any single reason
supporting exclusion of this witness' testimony, nor all
of them together, are very persuasive. 25 By contrast,
we find the arguments in favor of admitting the testimony
quite strong. For, when balancing the interests involved,
we must weigh the strong interest under any system of
justice of making available to the trier of fact all con~
cededly relevant and trustworthy evidence which either
party seeks to adduce. In this particular case we also
25 It has been suggested that courts 8hould exclude evidence
derived from "lawless invasions of the constitutional rights of
citizens ," Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1, 13 (1968), in recognition of
"the imperat ive of judicial integrity." Elkins v. United States, 364
·u. S. 206 , 222 (1960). This rationale, however, is really an a;;simi~
lation of the more ,;pecific rationales discussed in thf' tf'xt of this
opinion, and does not in their absence provide an independent basis
for excluding challenged evidence.

t;r,~kl
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''must consider society's interest in the effective prosecution of criminals in light of the protection our preMiranda standards afford criminal defendants." Jenkins
v. Delaware, 395 U. S. 213, 221 (1969 ). These interests
may be outweighed by the need to provide an effective
sanction to a constitutional right, Weeks v. United States,
232 U. S. 383 (1914) , but they must in any event be
valued. Here respondent's own statement, which might
have helped the prosecution show respondent's guilty
conscience at trial, had already been excised from the
prosecution 's case· pursuant to this Court's Miranda decision. To extend the excision furth er under the circumstances of this case and exclude relevant testimony
of a third-party witness would require far more persuasive
arguments than those advanced by respondent.
This Court has already recognized that a failure to
give interrogated suspects full Miranda warnings does
not entitle the suspect to insist that statements made by
him be excluded in every conceivable context, In H arR
ris v. New York , 401 U. S. 222 (1971 ), the Court was
faced with the question of wheth er the statements of the
defendant himself, taken without informing him of his
right of access to appointed counsel, could be used to
impeach defendant's direct testimony at trial. The Court
c.oncluded that they could , saying ·
"Some cornmeuts in the Miranda opinion can indeed
be read as indicating a bar to use of an uncounseled
statement for any purpose, but discussion of that
issue was not at all necessary to the Court's holding
and cannot be regarded as controlling. Miranda
barred the prosecution from making its case with
statements of an accused made while in custody
prior to having or effectively waiving counsel. It
does not follow from Miranda that evidence inadmissible against an accused in the prosecutiou 's case

.,

~~;:?
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m chief is barred for all purposes, provided
of course that the trustworthiness of the evidence
satisfies legal standards." 401 U. S., at 224.
We believe that this reasoning is equally applicable
here. Although Miranda enabled respondent to block
admission of his own statements, we do not believe that
it requires the prosecution to refrain from all use of those
statements, and we disagree with the courts below that
Henderson's testimony should have been excluded in this

case.
Reversed.

No. 73-482 MICHIGAN v. TUCKER
Memorandum of MR. JUSTICE POWELL.
I concur in the result reached by the Court, but do
so on different grounds.*

In Johnson v. New Jersey, 384

U.S. 719, decided one week after Miranda v. Arizona, 384
U.S. 436 (1966), the Court addressed the question whether
the "additional guidelines" of Miranda should be given
any retroactive effect.

Although the Court purported to

hold that Miranda "should not·· be applied retroactively,"
384 U.S. at 732, the opinion drew the line at the date of
commencement of trial rather than the date of the defendant's
statement or confession to the police.

The making of this

distinction was unnecessary to a decision of the case, as
both the interrogation and trial of the petitioners before
the Court had occurred some years before Miranda.

Never-

theless, the dictum has since been followed (provide citations).
No reasons were advanced in Johnson for the volunteered
assertion that Miranda would apply to trials commenced after
the announcement of that decision even though the interrogation had long preceded such announcement.

Indeed, the

*I find it unnecessary to reach the issue argued in this case
whether the Miranda warnings, when applicable to an interrogation are not given, preclude the testimony of a third party
witness whose identify is disclosed in the course of such
interrogation.

2.

rationale of Johnson would indicate precisely the opposite
view:
" . . . , retroactive application of Escobedo
and Miranda would seriously disrupt the
administration of our criminal laws. It would
require the retrial or release of numerous
prisoners found guilty by trustworthy evidence
in conformity with previously announced constitutional standards (384 U.S. at 731).

"Future defendants will benefit fuly from
our new standards governing in custody interrogation, while past defendants may still avail
themselves of the voluntariness test. Law
enforcement officers and trial courts will have
fair notice that statements taken in violation
of these standards may not be used against an
accused. (Id. at 372)."
If this rationale is applied to the present case
the "new standards'r of Miranda would not be applicable.
The in-custody interrogation of respondent occurred well
before the standards were enunciated.

No contention is

made by respondent that his statements were not voluntary,
and certainly they proved to be trustworthy.

Respondent

identified Henderson as a material witness, and he proved
to be all of that - though his testimony was not in accord
with resp ndent's expectations.
It is fictional to say that the police violated
Miranda when they interrogated respondent after giving him
the full warnings required by the then most relevant

3.
decision of this Court, Escobedo.*
fl._.,,.._

As admittedlyt\"new standards" prescribed by Miranda,
(384 U.S. at 732) wereR not in effect at the time, they
could not have been violated by the police.

The reasonj

most frequently given for the per~ application of the
Miranda standards or "additional guidelines" (384 U.S.
at 734) is that they deter improper police conduct.
this case, there was no

such misconduct.

In

Indeed, the

police would have been derelict in their duty both to
society and respondent had they failed to pursue the
"fruits" of their then lawfuli interrogation.

As the

Michigan Court of Appeals put it:

xk

"We specifically note that witness Henderson
was contacted initially by law enforcement
authorities as an alibi witness on behalf of
the defendant. Had he supported the defendant's
statement that he was scratched by the flailling
of a goose, defendant might never have stood
trial for the crime of what he had been
convicted. Furthermore, could anyone think
that the officers had fulfilled their duty
towards defendant had they chosen not to check
out his alibi?" Pet. for Cert. at 34 .

*See Peoijle v. Tucker, 19 Mich. App. 320, 172 N.W. 2d
712 (196 ), in which the Michi~an Court of Appeals stated
that at the time of "defendants interrogation on April
19, 1966, he was advised of his rights as delineated by
Escobedo v. Illinois, supra. See Petition for Cert,
p. 28.

....

~.

'.

... ...

4.
In sum, while agreeing fully with the Court's holding
in Johnson that Miranda "should not be applied retroactively"
(384 U.S. at 732), I find no analytical or principled basis
for the dictum t o the effect that the determinative time
is commencement of the trial rather than the interrogation
which elicited t he statements in question.
longer follow this dictum.

I would no

A rule without a rational basis,

and none has been suggested for this one, hardly merits
precedential respect.

-
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Mu. JUSTICE REHNQLI8T delivered the opinion of the
Court.
This case presents the question whether the testimony
of a witness in respondent's state court trial for rape must
be excluded simply because police had learned the identity
.of the witness by questioning respondent at a time when
he was in custody as a suspect. but had not been advised
that counsel would be appointed for him if he was indigent. The questioning took place before this Court's
decision in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), but
respondent's trial, at which he was convicted, took place
afterwards. Under the holding of Johnson v. New Jersey,
384 U. S. 719 (H)66), therefore, Miranda is applicable to this case. The Vnited 8tates District Court
for the Eastern District of Michigan reviewed peti~
tioners' claim on a petition for habeas corpus and held
that the testimony must be excluded.1 The Court o!
Appeals affirmed. 2

I
On the morning of April 19, 1966, a 43-year-old woman
in Pontiac, Michigan, was found in her home by a friend
1
;i

352 F . Supp. 266 (1972).
4so F, 2d 927 (1973).
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.and coworker, Luther White, in serious condition. At
the time she was found the woman was tied, gagged, and
partially disrobed, and had been both raped and severely
beaten. She was unable to tell White anything about
her assault at that time and still remains unable to
recollect what happened.
While White was attempting to get medical help for
the victim and to call for the police, he observed a dog
inside the house. Thi~ apparently attracted White's at•
tention for he knew that the woman did not own a dog
herself. Later, when talking with police ofhcers White
observed the dog a second time, and police followed the
dog to respondent's house. Neighbors further connected
the dog with respondent.
The police then arrested respondent and brought him
to the police station for questioning. Prior to the actual
interrogati011 the police asked respondent whether hl'
knew for what cri1ne he had been arrested , whether he
wanted an attorney and whether he understood his
constitutional rights, 3 Respondent replied that he did
understand the crime for which he ~as arrested, that he
did not want a.n attorney, and that he understood his
rights.4 The. police further advised him thnt any state ..
ments he might make could be used against him at a
later date in court. 5 The police. however. did not advise
:respondent that he would be furnish<>d counsel free of
charge if he could not pay for surh services hunself
The police then questioned respondent about his activ..
ities on the night of the rape and assault. Respondent
replied that during the general time period at issue he had
first been with one Robert Henderson and then later ai
home, alone, asleep. The police sought to confirm ihi11
3

Transcript of Preliminary Hearing, p, fl9,
1/bid.
6

lbid., :p. 99-,100,
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~tory by contacting Henderson, but Henderson's story
served to discredit rather than to bolster responden t's
account. Henderson acknowledged that respondent had
been with him on the night of the crime but said that he
had left at a relatively early time. Furthermore, Hen.;
derson told police that he saw respondent the following
clay and asked him at that time about scratches on his
face-"asked him if he got hold of a wild one or some•
thing." 6 Respondent answered , "[S]omething like
that." 1 Then, Henderson said, he asked respondent
"[W]ho it was," 8 and respondent said: "[S]ome woman
lived the next block over," u adding "She is a widow
woman" or words to that effect. 10
These events all occurred prior to the date on which
this Court handed down its decision in Miranda v. Ari~
zona, 384 U. S. 473, but respondent's trial occurred afterwards. Prior to trial respondent's appointed counsel
made a motion to exclude Henderson's expected testimony
because respondent had revealed Henderson's identity
without having received full Miranda warnings. Although respondent's own statements taken during interrogation were excluded. the trial judge denied the motion to
exclude Henderson 's testimony. Henderson therefore
testified at trial, and respondent was convicted of rape
and sentenced to 20 to 40 years' imprisonment. His
eonviction was affirmed by both the Michigan Court of
Appeals 11 and by the Michigan Supreme Court. 12
Respondent then sought habeas corpus relief in federal
district court. That court, noting that respondent had
6

Transcript of Trial, p. 223,

lbid.
8 Ibid., p. 224.
9 lbid.
10 Ibid.
7

11

12

19 Mich. App . 320, 172 N. W. 2d 712 (1969),
385 Mich 594, 189 N . W. 2d 290 (1971).
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not received the full Miranda warnings and that the
police had stipulated Henderson's identity was learned
only through respondent's answers, "reluctantly" concluded that Henderson's testimony could not be adm itted.13 Application of such an exclusionary rule was
necessary, the court reasoned, to protect respondent's
:Fifth Amendment right against compulsory self-incrimination . Th e court therefore granted respondent's petition for a writ of habeas corpus unless petitioner
retri ed respondent within 90 days. The Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed
\Ve grantc>d
certiorari, - , r. S. - , and now rcv<'n•e.

II
Although respondent's sole complaint is that the police
failed to advise him that he would be given free counsel
if unable to afford counsel himself, he did not, and does
not now, base his arguments for relief on a right to counsel
under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments. Nor was
the right to counsel, as such, considered to be persuasive
by either federal court below. We do not have a situation such as that presented in Escobedo v. Illinois, 378
U.S. 478 (1964), where the policemen interrogating the
suspect had refused his repeated requests to see his lawyer
who was then present at the police station. As we have
noted previously, Escobedo is not to be broadly extended
beyond the facts of tha t particular case. See Johnson v.
New Jersey, 384 U. S. 719, 733-734 (1966); Kirby v.
Illinois, 406 U. S. 682, 689 (1972) ; Frazier v. Cupp, 394
U. S. 731, 739 (1969). This case also falls outside the
rationale of Wade v. United States, 388 U. S. 218, 224
(1967), where the Court held that counsel was needed at
a post-indictment lineup in order to protect " the right
to a fair trial at which the witnesses against [ the defendant] might be meaningfully cross-examined." Hender.,
:\

3

352 F, Su:pp. 1 at 268,
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son was fully available for searching cross-examination
at respondent's trial.
Respondent's argument, and the opinions of the District
Court and Court of Appeals, instead rely upon the Fifth
Amendment right against compulsory self-incrimination
and the safeguards designed in Miranda to secure that
right. In brief, the position urged upon this Court is
that proper regard for the privilege against compulsory
self-incrimination requires, with limited exceptions not
applicable here, that all evidence derived solely from
statements made without full Miranda warnings be ex-eluded at a subsequellt criminal trial. For purposes of
analysis in this case we believe that the question thus
presented is best examined in two separate parts. We
will therefore first consider whether the police conduct
complained of directly infringed upon respondent's right
against compulsory self-i11crimination or whether it
instead violated only the prophylactic rules developed
to protect that right. We will then consider whether
the evidence derived from this mterrogation must be
excluded.

III
The history of the Fifth Ame11dment right against compulsory self-incrimination, and the evils against which it
was directed. have received considerable attention in the
opinions of this Court. See, e. g., Kastigar v. U11ited
States, 406 l:. S. 441 (1972); Miranda v. Arizona, supra;
Murphy v. Waterfront Commission, 378 "C. S. 52 (1964) ;
Ullmann v. United States, 350 U. ~- 422. 426 (1956);
Counselman v. Hitchcock , 142 U.S. 547 (1892). At this
point in our history virtually every schoolboy is familiar
with the concept, if not the language, of the provision
that reads: "2S"o person ... shall be compelled in any
criminal case to be a witness against himself .... '' This
Court's decisions have referred to the right as ''the mainstay of our adversary system of criminal justice," Johnson
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v. Kew Jersey, supra, at 729, and as "'one of the great
landmarks in man's struggle to make himself civilized.' ,,
Ullmann, supra, at 426. It is not surprising that the
constitution of virtually every State has a comparable
prov1s10n. VIII Wigmore, Evidence (McNaughton rev.
1961), § 2252.
The importance of a right does not, by itself, determine
its scope, and therefore we must continue to hark back
to the historical origins of the privilege, particularly the
evils at which it was to strike. The privilege against
compulsory self-incrimination was developed by pauuul
opposition to a course of ecclesiastical inquisitions and
Star Chamber proceedings occurring several centuries ago.
See Levy, Origins of the Fifth Amendment; Morgan, The
Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 34 Minn. L. Rev. 1
(1949); Wigmore, Evidence (McNaughton rev. H>61) ,
§ 2250. Certainly anyone who reads accounts of th.Jse
investigations, which placed a premium on compelling
subjects of the investigation to admit guilt from their
own lips, cannot help but be sensitive to the framers'
desire to protect citizens against such compulsion. As
this Court has noted, the privilege against self-incrimina,.
tion "was aimed at a .. . far-reaching evil- a recurrence
oj the Inquisition and the Star Chamber. even if not in
their stark brutality." Ullmann, supra, at 428.
Where there has been genuine compulsion of testimony,
the right has been given broad scope. Although the
constitutional language in which the privilege is cast
might be construed to apply only to situations in which
the prosecution seeks to call a defendant to testify against
himself at his criminal trial, its application has not been
so limited. The right has been held applicable to proceedings before a grand jury, Counselman v. Hitchcock,
142 U. S. 547 (1892), to civil proceedings, McCarthy v,
Arndstein, 266 U. S. 34 ( 1924) , to congressional investi-.
gations, Watkins v. United States, 354 U. S. 178 (1957),
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to juvenile proceedings, In re Gault, 387 U. S. 1 (1967),
and to other statutory inquiries. Malloy v. Hogan, 378
U. S. 1 (1964). The privilege has also been applied
against the States by virtue of the Fourteenth Amendment. Malloy, supra.
The natural concern which underlies many of these
decisions is that an inability to protect the right at
one stage of a proceeding may make its invocation useless
at a later stage. For example, a defendant's righ t not to
be compelled to testify against hirnself at his own trial
might be practically nullified if tlw prosPcution could
previously have required him to give evidence against
himself before a grand jury. Testimony obtained in civil
suits, or before administrative or legislative committees,
could"also prove so incriminating that a person com1wllecl
to give such testimony might readily he eom ictPd on the
basis of those disclosures in a subsequent crimrnal
proceeding. 1•i
In more recent years this concern-tha.t compelled disclosures might be used against a person at a later criminal
t rial- has been extended to cases involving police interrogation. Before Miranda the principal issue in these cases
was not whether a defendant had waived his privilege
agahist compulsory self-incrimination hut simply whether
his statement ·was "voluntary.'' ln state caf-'es the Court
applied the Due Process Clause of the Fourt<1enth AmellClment, examining the circumstances of interrogation to
determine whether the processes were so unfair or unreasonable as to render a subsequent confession involuntary.
See. e. g., Brown v. Mississippi, 297 F. S. 278 ( 1936);
Chambers L Florida, 309 V. S. 227 (1940); W hite v.
'Texas, 310 U. S. 530 (1940); Payne v. Arkansas, 356
14

The Court has also held that comment on a defemfant's silmce
or refusal to take the witness stand may be an impermissible penalty
on exercise of the privilege. See Griffin v, California, 380 U. S, 609
(1965).
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U.S. 560 (1958); Haynes\'. Washington, 373 U. S. 503
(1963). See also Wigmore. Evidence, § 815 et seq,
Where the State's actions offended the standards of fun ..
darnental fairness under the Due Process Clause, the
State was then deprived of the right to use the resulting
confessions in court.
Although federal cases concerning voluntary confessions
often contained references to the privilege against
rompulsory self-incrimination, L,; references which were
strongly criticized by some commentators. '-ef' VIIr Wigmore, Evidence (McXaughtu11 rev. H)Ol). ~ :2:2(:i6,"· it was
15 For example in Bram v. United States, 168 U . S. 532, 542
(1897) , the Court stated:
"In cnminal trials. m the courts of the United States, wherever a.

question ari~es whether n confession is incompetent bccnu~e uot
voluntary, the i~sue is coutrolled by that port10n of the Fifth
Amendment to the Constitution of the United State,,, commanding
that no person 'shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness agamst himself.'"
As noted in thf' text the privi)('ge ngain~t compubory :,e)f-inrrimination was not held applicable again~t the State,- until Malloy,·. Hogan.

378 U. S. 1 (196-!).
16

Wigmore states his ob.iection in the following term:":
"Today in the United States confessions. and probabl~· even les,-er
self-incriminating admissions, are exch1ded despite their trustworthiness if coerced . The polirie" leadmg to tlnl< receut extern,ion of
the confession rule are quite "nmlar to tho~(' mHlcrlYing thr privilege.
against. self-incrimination. It is thus not. >'urprismg that the privilege, with its unclear boundaries and appnrently unending capacity
for transmogrification and nssimilation, is now sometim~ invoked
to effect exclusion even though the disclosure was not. compelled
from a person under legal compulsion. Distortion of the privilege
to cover such situations i~ not necessary. If trustworth~• confessions are to be excluded because coerced, it ,,;hould be done frankly
as an exception to the principle of § 2183 suvra tlrnt the illc>gality of
source of evidence i:,1 immaterial. It should be done, as it usually is,
on the ground that the combi1rntion of coercion a11d u:;e of the evi.,
.dence in the particular case violates the relevant con,;titutional dt1e
proce~ clause," (Citations ODJitted.)
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110t until this Court's decision in Miranda that the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination was seen as the
principal protection for a person facing police interrogation . This privilege had been made applicable to the
States in Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 ( 1964) . and wai
thought to offer a more comprehensive and less subjective
protection than the doctrine of previous cases. In
Miranda the Court examined the facts of four separate
cases and stated:
"ln thesP casPs, we might not find thr defr11d a11 t:-'
statements to have been involuntary in traditiomll
terms. Our concern for adequate safeguards to pro•
tect precious Fifth Amendment rights is, of course,
not lessened in the slightest. . . . To be sure, the
records do not evince overt physical coercion or
patent psychological ploys. The fact remains that
in none of these cases did the officers undertake to
afford appropriate safeguards at the outset of the
interrogation to msure that the statements were truly
the product of free choice." 384 U. S., at 457.
Thus the Court in Miranda, for the first time, expressly
declared that the Self-Incrimination Clause was applicable to state interrogations at a police station, and that
a defendant's statements might be excluded at trial
despite their voluntary character under traditional
principles.
To supplement this new doctrine, and to help police
officers conduct interrogations without facing a continued
risk that valuable evidence would be lost, the Court in
Miranda established a set of specific protective guidelines, now commonly known as the Miranda rules. The
Court declared that "the prosecution may not use statements, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, stemming
from custodial interrogation of the defendant unless it
demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards effective
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to secure the privilege against self-incrimination." 384
U. S .. at 444. A series of recommended "procedural safeguards" then followed . The Court in particular stated :
"Prior to any questioning. the person must be
warned that he has a right to remain silent, that
any statement he does make may be used as evidence
against him, and that he has a right to the presence
of an attorney, either retained or appointed." 384
U. S., at 444.
The Court said that the defendant, of course, could
waive these rights, but tha.t any ,•.raiver must have been
made "voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently." 38.4
U. S.. at 444-.
The Court recognized tha.t these procedural safeguards
were not themselves rights protected by the Constitution
but were instead measures to insure that the right
against compulsory self-incrimiuation was protected. As
the Court remarked:
"[W]e cannot say that the Constitution necessarily
requires adherence to any particular solution tor the
inherent compulsions of the interrogation process as
it is presently conducted '' 384 "G. S., at 467.
The suggested safeguards were not intended to "create a
.constitutional straightjacket," 384 U. S., at 467, but
rather to provide practical reinforcement for the right
against compulsory self-incrimination.
A comparison of the facts in this case with the his-,
torical circumstances underlying the privilege against
compulsory self-incrimination strongly indicates that the
police conduct here did not deprive respondent of hh,
privilege against compulsory self-incrimination as such,
but rather failed to make available to him the full measure
of procedural safeguards associated with that right since
Miranda. Certainly no one could contend that the interrogation faced by respondeu t bore any resemblance to
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the historical practices at which the right against compulsory self-incrimination was aimed. The District Court in
this case noted that the police had "warned [respondent]
that he had the right to remain silent;' 352 F . Supp.,
at 267. and the record in this case clearly shows that
respondent was informed that a.ny evidence taken could
be used against him.17 ·The record is also clear tha't
respondent was asked whether he wanted an attorney
and that he replied that ·he did not. 18 Thus, his sta~..
ments could hardly be termed imolt.ntary as that tPrm
has been defined m the decisions of this Co urt. Addi·tionally. there were no legal sanctions. such a::, the threat
, of contempt. which could have been applied to respondent had he chosen to remain silent. He was simply not
exposed to "the cruel trilemma of self-accusation, perjury,
or contempt." Murphy v. Waterfront Commission, 37,
u. s. 52, 55 (1964).
Our determination that the interrogation '.n thi~ case
involved no compulsion sufficient to breach the nght
against compulsory self-i 11rrimi11atio11 dot''- not 1ue>a1 therP
was not a disregard, albPit an inadvertellt di:m•gard, o·· tlw
procedural ruks lat(•r estabfo,IH•d 111 Jfm!llda The qurstion for decision is how sweepin g the ,1udicially rn1posed
conseq uences of this disregard shall be. This Court said
in Miranda that statements taken in violatw11 of thP
Miranda principles n'iust not be used t o prove the prosecution 's case at trial, That requirement was fully
complied with by the state court here : respondent's
statements, claiming that he was with Henderson an'd
then asleep during the time period l f the cri 11t •re uot
admitted against him at trial, This Court has a.Iso said,
in lVong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963), that
· the "fruits"· of police conduct which actually infring~d
Set- n, 5 supra.
1s j:;lee nn. 3 and 4, ·sllpm.

11.-

~

~~

~
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a defendant's Fourth Amendment rights must be suppressed.10 But we have already concluded that the
police conduct at issue here did not abridge respondent's constitutional privilege against compulsory selfincrimination, but departed only from the prophylactic
standards later laid down by this Court in Miranda to
safeguard that pri vilege. Thus. in deciding whether Henderson 's testimo ny must be excluded . there is no cont rolling precedent of this Court to guide us. We must
therefore examine the matter as a question of principle,

IV
Just as the law does not require that a defendant
receive a perfect t rial, only a fair one, it cannot realistically require that policemen investigating serious crimes
make no errors whatsoever. The pressures of law
enforcement and the vagaries of humaJJ nature ,,,,ould
make such an expectation unrealistic. Before we
penalize police error. therefore. we must consider whether
the sanction serves a valid and useful purpose.
We have recently said, in a search and seizure context,
that the exclusionary rule's "prime purpose is to deter
fu ture unlawful police conduct and thereby to effectuate
the guarantee of the Fourth Amendment agamst unreasonable sea.rches and seizures." ( nited States v.
Calandra, slip op., p. 9. We then coutlnued:
.·
"'The rule is calculated to prevent, not to repair,
Its purpose 1s to deter-to compel respect for the
constitutional guaranty in the only effective available way-by removing the incentive to disregarq
19
In Wong Sun the police discoYrred pv1denrc through ::;tato~
ments made by the acrused after he had bren placP<l 11nder arre-st.
T his Court, finding that the arre~t had occu rred without probable
cam,e, held that the derivative end<·nce could not be rntroduce<l
against the accrn,ed at trial For the reason,, ,;t"tcd 111 the text we
do not believe that Wong .S1m c,mtrol~ the ca:;e hefore us.
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it.' Elkins v. United States, 364 U. S. 206,
(1960."

20

217
United States v. Calandra, slip op., p. 9.

ln a proper case this rationale would seem applicable
to the Fifth Amendment context as well.
The deterrent purpose of the exclusionary rule neces~
sarily assumes that the police have engaged in willful,
or at the very least, negligent conduct which has deprived
the defendant of some right. By refusing to admit
evidence gained as a result of si1ch contl uct, the court!%
hope to instil in those particular investigating officers,
or in their future counterparts, a r
towards the ri h
ccused
action
:b, .Q0wewr, the
deterre 1ce rationale losPs 1uvql;i 0f its force.
We consider it significant t<' our dE>ci•-i,)11 in ~h•:, casi>
that the officers' failure to advise respondent of his right
t o appointed counsel occurred prior to the decision in
Miranda ~ Although we have been urged to reso lve• the
broad questioh of whethrr evid<>nce derived from 8tatements takrn m violation of the Mfronda rules ll\USt hf'
excl uded regard less of when tlit int01-rog: tio11 took place~
we mstead place our holchng 011 a narrower ground,
For at the time respondellt was questio ued these
police officers were guided, quite rightly, by the principles
established in Escobedo, supra, partic ularly foc using on
the subject's opportunity to have retained counsel with
him during the foterrogatfon if he chose to do so,2~
20
The opinion also relied upon Mapp v. Ohio, 367 e. S. 643, 656
fl961); Tehan v. United States, e;r rel. Shot . 382 U S. 406, 416
(1966 ) ; and Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S, 1, 29 (1968). See blip op.1
p. 9.
21
Brief for lfnitl'd State~ 1~ Amicus Curiae p. ;31 et .~eq.; Brief
for Re,,pondl'nl, p. 9 et Sl'f/
22
As previously noted, the defenda nt in Escobedo hac!' repeatedly
asked to ~ee his lawyer who was available at the police stat10n.

'4"""
~~

~
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Thus, the police asked respondent if he wanted counsel,
and he answered that he did not. The statements actually made by the respondent to the police, as we have observed. were excluded at trial in accordance \vith Johnson \
v. New Jersey, supra. ·whatever deterrent effect on futur<:' police conduct the exclusion of those statements may
have had. we do not believe it would be significantly augmented by excluding the testimony of the wituess Henderson as well.
,Yhen involuntary statenwnts or the right against
]JUlsory self-incrimination are involved, a seco11d justification for the exclus10na ry rule also has h<'PU as~t•rte<L
protection of the courts from reliance on untrustworthy
evidence. 03 Cases which involve the Self-Incrimination
Clause must. by definition , involve an element of coercion,
since the clause provides only that a person shall not be
compelled to give evidence against himself. And cases
involving /\. statements often depict sev<:'re pr<:'ssures lnOb~tM~
I\
which may override a particular suspect·s rnsiste1Jce 011

com- 1

,,I

·r

Those reques1:5 ,,;ere denied. and the defendant ultmiately confo,,~ed.
Thus, in dir<'c t. contrast to the ~ituation here, the defendant in
Escobedo was told he did not have a right to see his lawyer, although
he had expres;::I~· stated his drsire to do ::;o.
23 The Court has made clear that the truth or faJ:51ty of a state..
ment is not the det ermining factor in the decision whether or not
to exclude it: Jackson v. Denno, 378 U. S. 368 (1964). Thus u.
Stute which has obtained a coerced or involuntary sta1emrnt cannot
argue for its admissibility on the ground that other f'\·idence demonstrates its truthfuTness. 1bid. But it also seems clear that coerced
sta tements have been regarded with some mistru~t. Tlw Court in
Escobedo, for example, stated that ''a system of enminal law enforcement which come;: to depend on the 'confession' will, in the long run,
be less reliable and more subject to ahuse" than a system relymg
on independent investigation, 378 U. S., at 489. The Court theft
cited to several authorities concerned with false confessions. 378
U. S., at 489, n. '11. Althotigh completely voluntary confessions
may, in many cases, advance the cause of justice and rehabilitation,
coerced confe;:;sions·, by their lll\ture, cirnnot sorve the same ends,
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innocence. Fact situations ranging from classical thirddegree torture, Brown v. Mississippi, supra, to prolonged
isolation from family or friends in a hostile setting, Gal-:.
legos v. Colorado, 370 U.S. 49 (1962). or to a simple desire on the part of a physically or mentally exhausted
suspect to have a seemingly endless interrogation endJ
·watts v. Indiana, 338 U. 8. 49 ( 1949); all might be suffi ..
t:ient to cause a defendant to accuse hiinself falsely.
But those situations are a far cry from that presented
here. The pressures on respondent to accuse himself
were hardly compa,ra,ble even with the least prejudicial
of those pressures which have been dealt with in our
cases. More important, the respondent did not accuse
himself. The evidence which the prosecution successfully
sought to introduce was not a confession of guilt by
respondent, or indeed even an exculpatory statement by
respondent. but rather the testimony of a third party
who was subjected to no custodial pressures. There is
plainly no reason to believe that Henderson's testimony
is untrustworthy simply because respondent was not advised of his right to appointed counsel. Henderson was
both available at tna] and subject to cross-examination
by respondent's counsel, and counsel fully used this opportunity, suggesting in the course of his crossexamination that Henderson's character \\ m, less than
exemplary and that he had been offered rncentives by the
police to testify against respondent. 2 • Thus the reliability of his testimony was subject to the normal testi ng
process of an adversary trial.
Respondent contends that an additional reason for excluding Henderson's testimony is the notion that the
adversarial system requires "the government in its contest
with the individual to shoulder the entire load." VIII
Wigmore, Evidence (McKaughton rev. 1961), § 2251;
24

Transcript of Trial, p. 226-234.
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Murphy v. Waterfront Commission, 378 U. S. 52, 55
'(1964); Miranda v. Arizona, supra, at 460.
To
the extent that this suggested basis for the exclusionary rule in Fifth Ani'endment cases may exist
independently of the deterrence and trustworthiness rae
tionales, we think it of no avail to petitioner here. Sube
ject to applicable constitutional limitations, the Governe
rnent is not forbidden all resort to the defendant to make
out its case. It may require the defendant to give physie
cal evidence against himself, see Schrnerber v. Californw.,
384 U. S. 757 (1966); United States v. Dionisio, 410
U. S. 1 (1973), and it may use statements which are
voluntarily given by the defendant a(ter he rec1ves full
disclosure of the rights offered by Miranda. Here we
deal not with the offer of defendant's own statements in
evidence, but only with the testimony of a witness whom
the police discovered as a result of defendant's statements. This recourse to respondent's voluntary statements does no violence to such elements of the adversarial system as may be embodied in the .Fifth, Sixth,
and Fourteenth Amendments.
In summary, we do not think that any single reason
supporting exclusion of this witness' testimony, nor all
of them together, are very persuasive. 2 5 By contrast,
we find the arguments in favor of admitting the testimony
quite strong. For. when balancing the interests involved,
we must weigh the strong interest under any system of
justice of making available to the trier of fact all conIt has been ,mggested that courts ~hould exclude evidence
derived from "lawless inva~ions of the ronstitu1 ional rights of
citizem,," Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1, 13 (1968), m rrrognit10n of
"the imperative of judicial integrHy." Elkins v. United States. 364
U. S. 206, 222 ( 1960) . This rationale, however, is really an assimifation of the more ,;pec1fic rationales di::;cussed in the text of thii
opinion, and does not in their abscncr providr an independent bnsi"
for excluding challenged evidence.
25

73-482-0PINI0N
MICHIGAN v. T UCKER

17

'·cededly relevant and trustworthy evidence which either
party seeks to adduce. In this particular case we also
"must consider society's interest in the effective prosecu ..
tion of criminals in light of the protection our preMiranda standards afford criminal defendants." Jenkins
v. Delaware, 395 U. S. 213. 221 (1969). These interests
may be outweighed by the need to provide an effective
sanction to a constitutional right, Weeks v. United States,
232 U. S. 383 (1914), but they must in any even t be
valued. Here respondent's own statement, which might
have helped the prosecution show respondent's guilty
conscience at trial, had already been excised from the
prosecution's case pursuant to this Court's Johnson decision. To extend the excision further under the cir~
cumstances of this case and exclude relevant testimony
of a third-party witness would require far more persuasive
arguments than those advanced by respondent.
This Court has already recognized that a failure to
give interrogated suspects fu ll Miranda warnings does
not entitle th e suspect to insist that statemen ts made by
him be excluded in every conceivable context. In Harris v. New York, 401 U. S. 222 (1971), the Court was
faced with the question of whether t.he statements of the
defendant himself, taken without informing him of his
right of access to appointed counsel, could be used to
impeach defendant's direct testimony at trial. The Court
concluded that they could, saying:
"Some comments in the Miranda opinion can indeed
be read as indicating a, bar to use of an uncounseled
statement for any purpose. but discussion of that
issue was not at all necessary to the Court's holding
and cannot be regarded as controlling. Miranda
barred the prosecution from making its case with
statements of an accused made while in custody
prior to having or effectively waiving counsel. It

I
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does not follow from Miranda that evidence inadmissible against an accused in the prosecution 's case
in chief is barred for all purposes, provided
of course that the trustworthiness of the evidence
satisfies legal standards." 401 U. S., at 224.
We believe that this reasoning is equally applicable
here. Although Johnson enabled respondent to block
admission of his own statements, we do not believe that
it requires the prosecution to refrain from all use of those
statements, and we disagree with the courts below that
Henderson's testimony should have been excluded in this

case.
Reversed.

I

-

..§u;ttmu QJottri: .of tqt ~~ j)uws

'Jlfaslp:nght~ J . QJ.

2llffe~~

CHAMBERS OF

THE CHIEF JUSTICE

May 22, 1974

Re:

73-482 - Michigan v. Tucker

Dear Bill:
Please join me.
Re g ards,
1

~

,(

U-)~ (j _)
Mr. Justice Rehnquist .
Copies to the Conference

j

-

.inp-utttt ('f ottrl o-f tJrt 'Jttttittb ~ mftg
'1ltslptt.gfott. l9. ('f. 20.;iJJ..;l

✓'

CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE HARRY A . BLACKMUN

May 27, 1974

I

Dear Bill:
Re:

No. 73-482 - Michigan v. Tucker

Please join me.
Sincerely,

11
Mr. Justice Rehnquist
Copies to the Conference

-

.§u:µumt <q01trt itf tltt ~ i t ~taftg
1l}ag!rittgfon, ~.

<q.

21lffeJ.l.~

CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL

June 3, 1974

Re: No. 73-482, State of Michigan v. Thomas W. Tucker

· Dear Bill:
Please join me in your concurring opinion.
Sincerely,

;)1/f (.
T.M.

Mr. Justice Brennan
cc: The Conference

/

-

J\llle 3, 1974

No. 73-482

Michigan v. Tucker

Dear 3ill:
Please join me.
Sincerely,

Mr. Justice Rehnquist
lfp/ss
cc:

The Conference

-

~iq.rrmtr <!Jon.rt of t!rc ~nitdt ~taks
Waol7i-lt~ton, gl. <!J. 20,SJi,:.J
CHA MBCRS OF

JUSTICE POTTER STEWART

June 5, 1974

73-482 - Michigan v. Tucker
Dear Bill,
I am glad to join your opinion for the
Court in this case. I have sent to the printer
a two-sentence concurrence.
Sincerely yours ,

n 1,
\ · ,'-'"(

1/
Mr. Justice Rehnquist
Copies to the Conference

✓

•

THE C. J .

W. 0. D.

W. J . B.

P. S.

-

B. R. W.

T . M.

H. A. B.

•

L. F . P.

W.H. R.

,

~
:: /-v'\; /--, y.

~

~-£

0

.
s-u..--1'{

('\ _,.&

.,.;u

~

(!~

j-/, /-, '/-

J~ {J),tf_ ~

to• s -7'f

~
ln-f -?~

,. .

'O,.,. .. ~.-"

1/U" ~~

6- >-'14

~cJJ(3
,,_......... >s

to- a-14

-

U{ft.

C~-7{

4/1/74

~

.-/3h>'

~ ~ \ r - /~~
S-l(,1~

--

~~

1,

I, /-,.1-

lcl ~
~ -l·lt

~~
~2~
I, /, ·hr·
? )('
~A ...

I.{.

73 -482 Mi c n.igan v. Tu ~ker

